Research Interests
Contracting, Philanthropic Donation, Sustainable Finance
Publication
Chu, Y., Liu, M. and Zhang, S. (2022). The JOBS Act and Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 72, p.102-153.
Zhang, S., and Shen, C. (2025). Large tariff cuts and corporate hedging: Evidence from interest rate swaps. Economics Letters, 257, 112691.
Working Papers
When Does Corporate Philanthropy Pay? An Information Perspective, with Vivian Fang and Varun Sharma
Abstract: We examine corporate philanthropy as a signal of firm product quality under limited attention. Linking local charitable donations to sales, we find no average effect but a strong fourth-quarter (Q4) lift, especially for firms with Q4-seasonal product mixes. The Q4 effect is also larger when the signal is likely more valuable: in weaker local economies where product quality matters more for consumers' purchase decisions; in more competitive markets where differentiation relies more on non-price signals; for firms with more geographically concentrated sales where attribution is clearer; and after negative product incidents when uncertainty about quality is higher. Overall, the results highlight an informational role of charitable donations, but only when consumers attend to and value such information.
Political Oversight and Public Contractor E&S Behavior, with Nick Gantchev and Jim Goldman
Presentations: FIRS, 2026
Abstract: Can governments use their purchasing power to discipline corporate misbehavior? Using data on 1.5 million U.S. federal contracts, we find that firms with recent severe environmental and social (E&S) incidents receive 12% smaller contracts. Critically, the response is political, not institutional: it is far larger at agencies whose appropriations subcommittee chairs have stronger pro-environmental and pro-labor voting records, so the same buyer’s discipline ranges from strong to negligible depending on who oversees the agency. The comparison holds the firm – and the firm-agency relationship – fixed. This discipline reaches further: high-oversight agencies direct fewer new awards to disciplined contractors, firms exposed to high oversight have fewer future E&S incidents, and those whose problems persist face more frequent contract modifications. Markets price severe incidents immediately, while the oversight-driven discipline surfaces in longer-run returns. Political oversight, in the end, sets how strongly public procurement disciplines corporate E&S misconduct.
When Charity Undermines Oversight: Independent Director Affiliated Donations and Corporate Hedging, with Frank Liu (Revise & Resubmit at International Review of Financial Analysis)
Public Voice in Supply Chains: How Speech Protection Shapes Buyer-Supplier Relationships, with Seyoung Seol and Sangho Chae (Revise & Resubmit at International Journal of Operations & Production Management)
Local Newspaper and Supply Chain Stability, with Seyoung Seol